Research papers and code for "Chawin Sitawarin":
Robustness is an increasingly important property of machine learning models as they become more and more prevalent. We propose a defense against adversarial examples based on a k-nearest neighbor (kNN) on the intermediate activation of neural networks. Our scheme surpasses state-of-the-art defenses on MNIST and CIFAR-10 against l2-perturbation by a significant margin. With our models, the mean perturbation norm required to fool our MNIST model is 3.07 and 2.30 on CIFAR-10. Additionally, we propose a simple certifiable lower bound on the l2-norm of the adversarial perturbation using a more specific version of our scheme, a 1-NN on representations learned by a Lipschitz network. Our model provides a nontrivial average lower bound of the perturbation norm, comparable to other schemes on MNIST with similar clean accuracy.

* Preprint
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
Despite a large amount of attention on adversarial examples, very few works have demonstrated an effective defense against this threat. We examine Deep k-Nearest Neighbor (DkNN), a proposed defense that combines k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and deep learning to improve the model's robustness to adversarial examples. It is challenging to evaluate the robustness of this scheme due to a lack of efficient algorithm for attacking kNN classifiers with large k and high-dimensional data. We propose a heuristic attack that allows us to use gradient descent to find adversarial examples for kNN classifiers, and then apply it to attack the DkNN defense as well. Results suggest that our attack is moderately stronger than any naive attack on kNN and significantly outperforms other attacks on DkNN.

* Published at Deep Learning and Security Workshop 2019 (IEEE S&P)
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
We propose the use of data transformations as a defense against evasion attacks on ML classifiers. We present and investigate strategies for incorporating a variety of data transformations including dimensionality reduction via Principal Component Analysis and data `anti-whitening' to enhance the resilience of machine learning, targeting both the classification and the training phase. We empirically evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility of linear transformations of data as a defense mechanism against evasion attacks using multiple real-world datasets. Our key findings are that the defense is (i) effective against the best known evasion attacks from the literature, resulting in a two-fold increase in the resources required by a white-box adversary with knowledge of the defense for a successful attack, (ii) applicable across a range of ML classifiers, including Support Vector Machines and Deep Neural Networks, and (iii) generalizable to multiple application domains, including image classification and human activity classification.

* 15 pages
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
Sign recognition is an integral part of autonomous cars. Any misclassification of traffic signs can potentially lead to a multitude of disastrous consequences, ranging from a life-threatening accident to even a large-scale interruption of transportation services relying on autonomous cars. In this paper, we propose and examine security attacks against sign recognition systems for Deceiving Autonomous caRs with Toxic Signs (we call the proposed attacks DARTS). In particular, we introduce two novel methods to create these toxic signs. First, we propose Out-of-Distribution attacks, which expand the scope of adversarial examples by enabling the adversary to generate these starting from an arbitrary point in the image space compared to prior attacks which are restricted to existing training/test data (In-Distribution). Second, we present the Lenticular Printing attack, which relies on an optical phenomenon to deceive the traffic sign recognition system. We extensively evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks in both virtual and real-world settings and consider both white-box and black-box threat models. Our results demonstrate that the proposed attacks are successful under both settings and threat models. We further show that Out-of-Distribution attacks can outperform In-Distribution attacks on classifiers defended using the adversarial training defense, exposing a new attack vector for these defenses.

* Submitted to ACM CCS 2018; Extended version of [1801.02780] Rogue Signs: Deceiving Traffic Sign Recognition with Malicious Ads and Logos
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
We propose a new real-world attack against the computer vision based systems of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Our novel Sign Embedding attack exploits the concept of adversarial examples to modify innocuous signs and advertisements in the environment such that they are classified as the adversary's desired traffic sign with high confidence. Our attack greatly expands the scope of the threat posed to AVs since adversaries are no longer restricted to just modifying existing traffic signs as in previous work. Our attack pipeline generates adversarial samples which are robust to the environmental conditions and noisy image transformations present in the physical world. We ensure this by including a variety of possible image transformations in the optimization problem used to generate adversarial samples. We verify the robustness of the adversarial samples by printing them out and carrying out drive-by tests simulating the conditions under which image capture would occur in a real-world scenario. We experimented with physical attack samples for different distances, lighting conditions and camera angles. In addition, extensive evaluations were carried out in the virtual setting for a variety of image transformations. The adversarial samples generated using our method have adversarial success rates in excess of 95% in the physical as well as virtual settings.

* Extended abstract accepted for the 1st Deep Learning and Security Workshop; 5 pages, 4 figures
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
As an initial assessment, over 480,000 labeled virtual images of normal highway driving were readily generated in Grand Theft Auto V's virtual environment. Using these images, a CNN was trained to detect following distance to cars/objects ahead, lane markings, and driving angle (angular heading relative to lane centerline): all variables necessary for basic autonomous driving. Encouraging results were obtained when tested on over 50,000 labeled virtual images from substantially different GTA-V driving environments. This initial assessment begins to define both the range and scope of the labeled images needed for training as well as the range and scope of labeled images needed for testing the definition of boundaries and limitations of trained networks. It is the efficacy and flexibility of a "GTA-V"-like virtual environment that is expected to provide an efficient well-defined foundation for the training and testing of Convolutional Neural Networks for safe driving. Additionally, described is the Princeton Virtual Environment (PVE) for the training, testing and enhancement of safe driving AI, which is being developed using the video-game engine Unity. PVE is being developed to recreate rare but critical corner cases that can be used in re-training and enhancing machine learning models and understanding the limitations of current self driving models. The Florida Tesla crash is being used as an initial reference.

* 15 pages, 4 figures, under review by TRB 2018 Annual Meeting
Click to Read Paper and Get Code
A large body of recent work has investigated the phenomenon of evasion attacks using adversarial examples for deep learning systems, where the addition of norm-bounded perturbations to the test inputs leads to incorrect output classification. Previous work has investigated this phenomenon in closed-world systems where training and test inputs follow a pre-specified distribution. However, real-world implementations of deep learning applications, such as autonomous driving and content classification are likely to operate in the open-world environment. In this paper, we demonstrate the success of open-world evasion attacks, where adversarial examples are generated from out-of-distribution inputs (OOD adversarial examples). In our study, we use 11 state-of-the-art neural network models trained on 3 image datasets of varying complexity. We first demonstrate that state-of-the-art detectors for out-of-distribution data are not robust against OOD adversarial examples. We then consider 5 known defenses for adversarial examples, including state-of-the-art robust training methods, and show that against these defenses, OOD adversarial examples can achieve up to 4$\times$ higher target success rates compared to adversarial examples generated from in-distribution data. We also take a quantitative look at how open-world evasion attacks may affect real-world systems. Finally, we present the first steps towards a robust open-world machine learning system.

* 18 pages, 5 figures, 9 tables
Click to Read Paper and Get Code