Add to Chrome
Add to Firefox
Add to EdgeDeepNcode: Encoding-Based Protection against Bit-Flip Attacks on Neural Networks
May 22, 2024
Fault injection attacks are a potent threat against embedded implementations of neural network models. Several attack vectors have been proposed, such as misclassification, model extraction, and trojan/backdoor planting. Most of these attacks work by flipping bits in the memory where quantized model parameters are stored. In this paper, we introduce an encoding-based protection method against bit-flip attacks on neural networks, titled DeepNcode. We experimentally evaluate our proposal with several publicly available models and datasets, by using state-of-the-art bit-flip attacks: BFA, T-BFA, and TA-LBF. Our results show an increase in protection margin of up to $7.6\times$ for $4-$bit and $12.4\times$ for $8-$bit quantized networks. Memory overheads start at $50\%$ of the original network size, while the time overheads are negligible. Moreover, DeepNcode does not require retraining and does not change the original accuracy of the model.
Efficiency in Focus: LayerNorm as a Catalyst for Fine-tuning Medical Visual Language Pre-trained Models
Apr 25, 2024In the realm of Medical Visual Language Models (Med-VLMs), the quest for universal efficient fine-tuning mechanisms remains paramount, especially given researchers in interdisciplinary fields are often extremely short of training resources, yet largely unexplored. Given the unique challenges in the medical domain, such as limited data scope and significant domain-specific requirements, evaluating and adapting Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) methods specifically for Med-VLMs is essential. Most of the current PEFT methods on Med-VLMs have yet to be comprehensively investigated but mainly focus on adding some components to the model's structure or input. However, fine-tuning intrinsic model components often yields better generality and consistency, and its impact on the ultimate performance of Med-VLMs has been widely overlooked and remains understudied. In this paper, we endeavour to explore an alternative to traditional PEFT methods, especially the impact of fine-tuning LayerNorm layers, FFNs and Attention layers on the Med-VLMs. Our comprehensive studies span both small-scale and large-scale Med-VLMs, evaluating their performance under various fine-tuning paradigms across tasks such as Medical Visual Question Answering and Medical Imaging Report Generation. The findings reveal unique insights into the effects of intrinsic parameter fine-tuning methods on fine-tuning Med-VLMs to downstream tasks and expose fine-tuning solely the LayerNorm layers not only surpasses the efficiency of traditional PEFT methods but also retains the model's accuracy and generalization capabilities across a spectrum of medical downstream tasks. The experiments show LayerNorm fine-tuning's superior adaptability and scalability, particularly in the context of large-scale Med-VLMs.
A Desynchronization-Based Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Analysis of Neural Networks
Mar 25, 2023
Model extraction attacks have been widely applied, which can normally be used to recover confidential parameters of neural networks for multiple layers. Recently, side-channel analysis of neural networks allows parameter extraction even for networks with several multiple deep layers with high effectiveness. It is therefore of interest to implement a certain level of protection against these attacks. In this paper, we propose a desynchronization-based countermeasure that makes the timing analysis of activation functions harder. We analyze the timing properties of several activation functions and design the desynchronization in a way that the dependency on the input and the activation type is hidden. We experimentally verify the effectiveness of the countermeasure on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller and employ a t-test to show the side-channel information leakage. The overhead ultimately depends on the number of neurons in the fully-connected layer, for example, in the case of 4096 neurons in VGG-19, the overheads are between 2.8% and 11%.
FooBaR: Fault Fooling Backdoor Attack on Neural Network Training
Sep 23, 2021
Neural network implementations are known to be vulnerable to physical attack vectors such as fault injection attacks. As of now, these attacks were only utilized during the inference phase with the intention to cause a misclassification. In this work, we explore a novel attack paradigm by injecting faults during the training phase of a neural network in a way that the resulting network can be attacked during deployment without the necessity of further faulting. In particular, we discuss attacks against ReLU activation functions that make it possible to generate a family of malicious inputs, which are called fooling inputs, to be used at inference time to induce controlled misclassifications. Such malicious inputs are obtained by mathematically solving a system of linear equations that would cause a particular behaviour on the attacked activation functions, similar to the one induced in training through faulting. We call such attacks fooling backdoors as the fault attacks at the training phase inject backdoors into the network that allow an attacker to produce fooling inputs. We evaluate our approach against multi-layer perceptron networks and convolutional networks on a popular image classification task obtaining high attack success rates (from 60% to 100%) and high classification confidence when as little as 25 neurons are attacked while preserving high accuracy on the originally intended classification task.
SNIFF: Reverse Engineering of Neural Networks with Fault Attacks
Feb 23, 2020
Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable against fault injection attacks. These attacks change the physical behavior of the device during the computation, resulting in a change of value that is currently being computed. They can be realized by various fault injection techniques, ranging from clock/voltage glitching to application of lasers to rowhammer. In this paper we explore the possibility to reverse engineer neural networks with the usage of fault attacks. SNIFF stands for sign bit flip fault, which enables the reverse engineering by changing the sign of intermediate values. We develop the first exact extraction method on deep-layer feature extractor networks that provably allows the recovery of the model parameters. Our experiments with Keras library show that the precision error for the parameter recovery for the tested networks is less than $10^{-13}$ with the usage of 64-bit floats, which improves the current state of the art by 6 orders of magnitude. Additionally, we discuss the protection techniques against fault injection attacks that can be applied to enhance the fault resistance.
DeepLaser: Practical Fault Attack on Deep Neural Networks
Sep 29, 2018
As deep learning systems are widely adopted in safety- and security-critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles, banking systems, etc., malicious faults and attacks become a tremendous concern, which potentially could lead to catastrophic consequences. In this paper, we initiate the first study of leveraging physical fault injection attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), by using laser injection technique on embedded systems. In particular, our exploratory study targets four widely used activation functions in DNNs development, that are the general main building block of DNNs that creates non-linear behaviors -- ReLu, softmax, sigmoid, and tanh. Our results show that by targeting these functions, it is possible to achieve a misclassification by injecting faults into the hidden layer of the network. Such result can have practical implications for real-world applications, where faults can be introduced by simpler means (such as altering the supply voltage).