Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

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Jun 19, 2020
Bruno Yun, Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren

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In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

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