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Add to EdgeTrust AI Regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation
Mar 14, 2024
There is general agreement that some form of regulation is necessary both for AI creators to be incentivised to develop trustworthy systems, and for users to actually trust those systems. But there is much debate about what form these regulations should take and how they should be implemented. Most work in this area has been qualitative, and has not been able to make formal predictions. Here, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by users, AI creators, and regulators, and provide insights into the possible effects of different regulatory regimes. We show that creating trustworthy AI and user trust requires regulators to be incentivised to regulate effectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of two mechanisms that can achieve this. The first is where governments can recognise and reward regulators that do a good job. In that case, if the AI system is not too risky for users then some level of trustworthy development and user trust evolves. We then consider an alternative solution, where users can condition their trust decision on the effectiveness of the regulators. This leads to effective regulation, and consequently the development of trustworthy AI and user trust, provided that the cost of implementing regulations is not too high. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the effect of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.
Both eyes open: Vigilant Incentives help Regulatory Markets improve AI Safety
Mar 06, 2023
In the context of rapid discoveries by leaders in AI, governments must consider how to design regulation that matches the increasing pace of new AI capabilities. Regulatory Markets for AI is a proposal designed with adaptability in mind. It involves governments setting outcome-based targets for AI companies to achieve, which they can show by purchasing services from a market of private regulators. We use an evolutionary game theory model to explore the role governments can play in building a Regulatory Market for AI systems that deters reckless behaviour. We warn that it is alarmingly easy to stumble on incentives which would prevent Regulatory Markets from achieving this goal. These 'Bounty Incentives' only reward private regulators for catching unsafe behaviour. We argue that AI companies will likely learn to tailor their behaviour to how much effort regulators invest, discouraging regulators from innovating. Instead, we recommend that governments always reward regulators, except when they find that those regulators failed to detect unsafe behaviour that they should have. These 'Vigilant Incentives' could encourage private regulators to find innovative ways to evaluate cutting-edge AI systems.
Social Diversity Reduces the Complexity and Cost of Fostering Fairness
Nov 18, 2022
Institutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of appropriately distributing endowments. No budget is limitless and optimising overall spending without sacrificing positive outcomes has been approached and resolved using several heuristics. To date, prior works have failed to consider how to encourage fairness in a population where social diversity is ubiquitous, and in which investors can only partially observe the population. Herein, by incorporating social diversity in the Ultimatum game through heterogeneous graphs, we investigate the effects of several interference mechanisms which assume incomplete information and flexible standards of fairness. We quantify the role of diversity and show how it reduces the need for information gathering, allowing us to relax a strict, costly interference process. Furthermore, we find that the influence of certain individuals, expressed by different network centrality measures, can be exploited to further reduce spending if minimal fairness requirements are lowered. Our results indicate that diversity changes and opens up novel mechanisms available to institutions wishing to promote fairness. Overall, our analysis provides novel insights to guide institutional policies in socially diverse complex systems.
GRADE: Graph Dynamic Embedding
Jul 16, 2020
Representation learning of static and more recently dynamically evolving graphs has gained noticeable attention. Existing approaches for modelling graph dynamics focus extensively on the evolution of individual nodes independently of the evolution of mesoscale community structures. As a result, current methods do not provide useful tools to study and cannot explicitly capture temporal community dynamics. To address this challenge, we propose GRADE - a probabilistic model that learns to generate evolving node and community representations by imposing a random walk prior over their trajectories. Our model also learns node community membership which is updated between time steps via a transition matrix. At each time step link generation is performed by first assigning node membership from a distribution over the communities, and then sampling a neighbor from a distribution over the nodes for the assigned community. We parametrize the node and community distributions with neural networks and learn their parameters via variational inference. Experiments demonstrate GRADE meets or outperforms baselines in dynamic link prediction, shows favourable performance on dynamic community detection, and identifies coherent and interpretable evolving communities.