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Intrusion Tolerance for Networked Systems through Two-Level Feedback Control
Apr 02, 2024
We formulate intrusion tolerance for a system with service replicas as a two-level optimal control problem. On the local level node controllers perform intrusion recovery, and on the global level a system controller manages the replication factor. The local and global control problems can be formulated as classical problems in operations research, namely, the machine replacement problem and the inventory replenishment problem. Based on this formulation, we design TOLERANCE, a novel control architecture for intrusion-tolerant systems. We prove that the optimal control strategies on both levels have threshold structure and design efficient algorithms for computing them. We implement and evaluate TOLERANCE in an emulation environment where we run 10 types of network intrusions. The results show that TOLERANCE can improve service availability and reduce operational cost compared with state-of-the-art intrusion-tolerant systems.
Conjectural Online Learning with First-order Beliefs in Asymmetric Information Stochastic Games
Mar 08, 2024Asymmetric information stochastic games (\textsc{aisg}s) arise in many complex socio-technical systems, such as cyber-physical systems and IT infrastructures. Existing computational methods for \textsc{aisg}s are primarily offline and can not adapt to equilibrium deviations. Further, current methods are limited to special classes of \textsc{aisg}s to avoid belief hierarchies. To address these limitations, we propose conjectural online learning (\textsc{col}), an online method for generic \textsc{aisg}s. \textsc{col} uses a forecaster-actor-critic (\textsc{fac}) architecture where subjective forecasts are used to conjecture the opponents' strategies within a lookahead horizon, and Bayesian learning is used to calibrate the conjectures. To adapt strategies to nonstationary environments, \textsc{col} uses online rollout with cost function approximation (actor-critic). We prove that the conjectures produced by \textsc{col} are asymptotically consistent with the information feedback in the sense of a relaxed Bayesian consistency. We also prove that the empirical strategy profile induced by \textsc{col} converges to the Berk-Nash equilibrium, a solution concept characterizing rationality under subjectivity. Experimental results from an intrusion response use case demonstrate \textsc{col}'s superiority over state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods against nonstationary attacks.
Automated Security Response through Online Learning with Adaptive Conjectures
Feb 19, 2024We study automated security response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed, non-stationary game. We relax the standard assumption that the game model is correctly specified and consider that each player has a probabilistic conjecture about the model, which may be misspecified in the sense that the true model has probability 0. This formulation allows us to capture uncertainty about the infrastructure and the intents of the players. To learn effective game strategies online, we design a novel method where a player iteratively adapts its conjecture using Bayesian learning and updates its strategy through rollout. We prove that the conjectures converge to best fits, and we provide a bound on the performance improvement that rollout enables with a conjectured model. To characterize the steady state of the game, we propose a variant of the Berk-Nash equilibrium. We present our method through an advanced persistent threat use case. Simulation studies based on testbed measurements show that our method produces effective security strategies that adapt to a changing environment. We also find that our method enables faster convergence than current reinforcement learning techniques.
Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition
Sep 15, 2023We study automated intrusion response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense strategies co-evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play toward an equilibrium. Solutions proposed in previous work prove the feasibility of this approach for small infrastructures but do not scale to realistic scenarios due to the exponential growth in computational complexity with the infrastructure size. We address this problem by introducing a method that recursively decomposes the game into subgames which can be solved in parallel. Applying optimal stopping theory we show that the best response strategies in these subgames exhibit threshold structures, which allows us to compute them efficiently. To solve the decomposed game we introduce an algorithm called Decompositional Fictitious Self-Play (DFSP), which learns Nash equilibria through stochastic approximation. We evaluate the learned strategies in an emulation environment where real intrusions and response actions can be executed. The results show that the learned strategies approximate an equilibrium and that DFSP significantly outperforms a state-of-the-art algorithm for a realistic infrastructure configuration.
Optimal Observation-Intervention Trade-Off in Optimisation Problems with Causal Structure
Sep 05, 2023
We consider the problem of optimising an expensive-to-evaluate grey-box objective function, within a finite budget, where known side-information exists in the form of the causal structure between the design variables. Standard black-box optimisation ignores the causal structure, often making it inefficient and expensive. The few existing methods that consider the causal structure are myopic and do not fully accommodate the observation-intervention trade-off that emerges when estimating causal effects. In this paper, we show that the observation-intervention trade-off can be formulated as a non-myopic optimal stopping problem which permits an efficient solution. We give theoretical results detailing the structure of the optimal stopping times and demonstrate the generality of our approach by showing that it can be integrated with existing causal Bayesian optimisation algorithms. Experimental results show that our formulation can enhance existing algorithms on real and synthetic benchmarks.
Learning Near-Optimal Intrusion Responses Against Dynamic Attackers
Jan 11, 2023
We study automated intrusion response and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game where attack and defense strategies evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play. The game-theoretic modeling enables us to find defender strategies that are effective against a dynamic attacker, i.e. an attacker that adapts its strategy in response to the defender strategy. Further, the optimal stopping formulation allows us to prove that optimal strategies have threshold properties. To obtain near-optimal defender strategies, we develop Threshold Fictitious Self-Play (T-FP), a fictitious self-play algorithm that learns Nash equilibria through stochastic approximation. We show that T-FP outperforms a state-of-the-art algorithm for our use case. The experimental part of this investigation includes two systems: a simulation system where defender strategies are incrementally learned and an emulation system where statistics are collected that drive simulation runs and where learned strategies are evaluated. We argue that this approach can produce effective defender strategies for a practical IT infrastructure.
Learning Security Strategies through Game Play and Optimal Stopping
May 29, 2022
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play. The game-theoretic perspective allows us to find defender strategies that are effective against dynamic attackers. The optimal stopping formulation gives us insight into the structure of optimal strategies, which we show to have threshold properties. To obtain the optimal defender strategies, we introduce T-FP, a fictitious self-play algorithm that learns Nash equilibria through stochastic approximation. We show that T-FP outperforms a state-of-the-art algorithm for our use case. Our overall method for learning and evaluating strategies includes two systems: a simulation system where defender strategies are incrementally learned and an emulation system where statistics are produced that drive simulation runs and where learned strategies are evaluated. We conclude that this approach can produce effective defender strategies for a practical IT infrastructure.
A System for Interactive Examination of Learned Security Policies
Apr 03, 2022
We present a system for interactive examination of learned security policies. It allows a user to traverse episodes of Markov decision processes in a controlled manner and to track the actions triggered by security policies. Similar to a software debugger, a user can continue or or halt an episode at any time step and inspect parameters and probability distributions of interest. The system enables insight into the structure of a given policy and in the behavior of a policy in edge cases. We demonstrate the system with a network intrusion use case. We examine the evolution of an IT infrastructure's state and the actions prescribed by security policies while an attack occurs. The policies for the demonstration have been obtained through a reinforcement learning approach that includes a simulation system where policies are incrementally learned and an emulation system that produces statistics that drive the simulation runs.
Intrusion Prevention through Optimal Stopping
Oct 30, 2021
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the problem of intrusion prevention as an (optimal) multiple stopping problem. This formulation gives us insight into the structure of optimal policies, which we show to have threshold properties. For most practical cases, it is not feasible to obtain an optimal defender policy using dynamic programming. We therefore develop a reinforcement learning approach to approximate an optimal policy. Our method for learning and validating policies includes two systems: a simulation system where defender policies are incrementally learned and an emulation system where statistics are produced that drive simulation runs and where learned policies are evaluated. We show that our approach can produce effective defender policies for a practical IT infrastructure of limited size. Inspection of the learned policies confirms that they exhibit threshold properties.
Learning Intrusion Prevention Policies through Optimal Stopping
Jun 14, 2021
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. In a novel approach, we formulate the problem of intrusion prevention as an optimal stopping problem. This formulation allows us insight into the structure of the optimal policies, which turn out to be threshold based. Since the computation of the optimal defender policy using dynamic programming is not feasible for practical cases, we approximate the optimal policy through reinforcement learning in a simulation environment. To define the dynamics of the simulation, we emulate the target infrastructure and collect measurements. Our evaluations show that the learned policies are close to optimal and that they indeed can be expressed using thresholds.