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Joint Behavior and Common Belief
Mar 13, 2023
For over 25 years, common belief has been widely viewed as necessary for joint behavior. But this is not quite correct. We show by example that what can naturally be thought of as joint behavior can occur without common belief. We then present two variants of common belief that can lead to joint behavior, even without standard common belief ever being achieved, and show that one of them, action-stamped common belief, is in a sense necessary and sufficient for joint behavior. These observations are significant because, as is well known, common belief is quite difficult to achieve in practice, whereas these variants are more easily achievable.
Combining the Causal Judgments of Experts with Possibly Different Focus Areas
May 20, 2020
In many real-world settings, a decision-maker must combine information provided by different experts in order to decide on an effective policy. Alrajeh, Chockler, and Halpern [2018] showed how to combine causal models that are compatible in the sense that, for variables that appear in both models, the experts agree on the causal structure. In this work we show how causal models can be combined in cases where the experts might disagree on the causal structure for variables that appear in both models due to having different focus areas. We provide a new formal definition of compatibility of models in this setting and show how compatible models can be combined. We also consider the complexity of determining whether models are compatible. We believe that the notions defined in this work are of direct relevance to many practical decision making scenarios that come up in natural, social, and medical science settings.
Blameworthiness in Multi-Agent Settings
Mar 11, 2019We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in settings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a negative outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blameworthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a distribution over causal models that describe how the outcome might arise). We then show how we can go from an ascription of blameworthiness for groups to an ascription of blameworthiness for individuals using a standard notion from cooperative game theory, the Shapley value. We believe that getting a good notion of blameworthiness in a group setting will be critical for designing autonomous agents that behave in a moral manner.