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Probing Unlearned Diffusion Models: A Transferable Adversarial Attack Perspective
Apr 30, 2024
Advanced text-to-image diffusion models raise safety concerns regarding identity privacy violation, copyright infringement, and Not Safe For Work content generation. Towards this, unlearning methods have been developed to erase these involved concepts from diffusion models. However, these unlearning methods only shift the text-to-image mapping and preserve the visual content within the generative space of diffusion models, leaving a fatal flaw for restoring these erased concepts. This erasure trustworthiness problem needs probe, but previous methods are sub-optimal from two perspectives: (1) Lack of transferability: Some methods operate within a white-box setting, requiring access to the unlearned model. And the learned adversarial input often fails to transfer to other unlearned models for concept restoration; (2) Limited attack: The prompt-level methods struggle to restore narrow concepts from unlearned models, such as celebrity identity. Therefore, this paper aims to leverage the transferability of the adversarial attack to probe the unlearning robustness under a black-box setting. This challenging scenario assumes that the unlearning method is unknown and the unlearned model is inaccessible for optimization, requiring the attack to be capable of transferring across different unlearned models. Specifically, we employ an adversarial search strategy to search for the adversarial embedding which can transfer across different unlearned models. This strategy adopts the original Stable Diffusion model as a surrogate model to iteratively erase and search for embeddings, enabling it to find the embedding that can restore the target concept for different unlearning methods. Extensive experiments demonstrate the transferability of the searched adversarial embedding across several state-of-the-art unlearning methods and its effectiveness for different levels of concepts.
Is It Possible to Backdoor Face Forgery Detection with Natural Triggers?
Dec 31, 2023Deep neural networks have significantly improved the performance of face forgery detection models in discriminating Artificial Intelligent Generated Content (AIGC). However, their security is significantly threatened by the injection of triggers during model training (i.e., backdoor attacks). Although existing backdoor defenses and manual data selection can mitigate those using human-eye-sensitive triggers, such as patches or adversarial noises, the more challenging natural backdoor triggers remain insufficiently researched. To further investigate natural triggers, we propose a novel analysis-by-synthesis backdoor attack against face forgery detection models, which embeds natural triggers in the latent space. We thoroughly study such backdoor vulnerability from two perspectives: (1) Model Discrimination (Optimization-Based Trigger): we adopt a substitute detection model and find the trigger by minimizing the cross-entropy loss; (2) Data Distribution (Custom Trigger): we manipulate the uncommon facial attributes in the long-tailed distribution to generate poisoned samples without the supervision from detection models. Furthermore, to completely evaluate the detection models towards the latest AIGC, we utilize both state-of-the-art StyleGAN and Stable Diffusion for trigger generation. Finally, these backdoor triggers introduce specific semantic features to the generated poisoned samples (e.g., skin textures and smile), which are more natural and robust. Extensive experiments show that our method is superior from three levels: (1) Attack Success Rate: ours achieves a high attack success rate (over 99%) and incurs a small model accuracy drop (below 0.2%) with a low poisoning rate (less than 3%); (2) Backdoor Defense: ours shows better robust performance when faced with existing backdoor defense methods; (3) Human Inspection: ours is less human-eye-sensitive from a comprehensive user study.